In establishing murder, one of the fundamental rudiments is Causation, otherwise known as Novus Actus Interveniens. Quintessential cases in portraying the aforementioned are; R v Jordan, R v Smith, R v Blaue, and R v Dalloway.

Firstly, it is important to understand the element before it is demonstrated in a case. Thus, causation simply means the act of the appellant must have caused the death of the victim. In other words, it must have been the substantial/operating/proximate cause of why the victim is deceased. However, it doesn’t necessarily have to be the sole cause of the death, as in a few cases such as R v Cheshire whereby inappropriate medical treatment was an additional reason for the victim’s death, or R v Holland in which the victim’s refusal of medical treatment due to his religious affiliations was partially to blame for his death. The point is that there must be a direct connection between the appellant’s action and cause of death.

In latin, this is known as ‘novus actus interveniens’, which elucidates that there must be nothing intervening to disrupt causation.

For example, if A hits C with his car and C dies of hypertension, if the doctor concludes the high blood pressure was brought about by the car accident, thus the car accident being the proximate cause of death, A will be charged.

If the car hitting C didn’t onset the high blood pressure, and C was due to die of hypertension, then A wouldn’t be charged. (depending on mens rea it could be murder or manslaughter)

Consequently, this introduces the ‘but for test’ used to determine whether or not causation is present. Essentially, it questions; if it weren’t for A hitting C down with his car, C wouldn’t have died. Hence,(‘but for’ A hitting C, C wouldn’t have died). If it is proven true, A would be charged, otherwise if false (which would imply C would have died whether or not A hit him with his car), then A would not be held guilty.

Subsequently, we will look at the cases mentioned above, to explore the element.

1. R v Jordan

Facts:

In this case, the defendant was convicted for murdering the victim by stabbing him. He appealed the case and it was heard by the Court of Appeal. During his appeal additional medical evidence was presented that was not available at the trial. It was stated that initially the  victim was recovering from his wounds but he was administered excessive doses of an antibiotic that caused an allergic reaction. The defendant claimed that it was the actions of the medical staff that caused the victim’s death and not the initial stabbing.

Issue:

Whether the defendant could be held responsible for the death of the victim. Were the actions of the medical staff enough to break the chain of causation? Do the actions of the medical team constitute novus actus interveniens?

Law Applied:

The law applied is Novus Actus Interveniens. This means that a new intervening act broke the chain of causation between the defendant’s actions and the victim’s death. In this case it would be that the treatment the victim received from the medical staff was the new intervening act that broke the chain of causation removing criminal liability from the defendant, Jordan.

Ratio Decidendi:

The Court ruled that Jordan, the defendant, was not criminally liable for the death of the victim. It was held that the treatment the victim received was “palpably wrong” and that it broke the chain of causation. In essence, the damage caused by Jordan  was not the substantial cause for the death of the victim, it was the mistreatment received from the medical staff.

2. R v Smith

To establish causation in law, it must be proven that the Defendant’s act was the

substantive and operating cause of the harm: R v Smith [1959]

Facts:

In R v Smith, Smith had been convicted at court martial of the murder of another soldier

by stabbing him. The victim had been dropped twice while being taken to the medical reception station and was subsequently given treatment which was said to be incorrect and harmful. Lord Parker CJ, giving the judgment of the Court Martial Appeal Court rejected a contention that his death did not result from the stab wound.

Issue :

Whether Smiths actions were a direct cause of the victims death given that the doctor was negligent in treating the patient

Law applied:

The court applied the “substantial cause” test for causation. It ruled that as long as the defendant's actions were a significant and substantial cause of the outcome even if other factors like medical treatment played a role the defendant could be held liable for murder. Thus, smith was deemed responsible for the death despite the medical negligence

3. R v Blaue

Facts

In R v Blaue (1975), the defendant, Blaue, stabbed a young woman four times after she rejected his sexual advances. Following the attack, the victim, a Jehovah's Witness, was admitted to the hospital, where medical professionals recommended a potentially life-saving blood transfusion. However, due to her religious convictions, the victim refused the transfusion and subsequently succumbed to her injuries. Consequently, Blaue was charged with manslaughter.

Issue

The issue is whether or not the victim’s decision to refuse medical attention/treatment due to her religious backgrounds and beliefs broke the chain of causation between her death and the defendant’s ,Blaue, stabbing.

Law Applied

In R v Blaue (1975), the court applied the "thin skull rule," requiring the defendant to take the victim as they are, including any vulnerabilities or beliefs. A defendant remains fully responsible for the consequences of their actions, even if the victim has an unusual vulnerability, condition, or belief that exacerbates the harm beyond what might be expected.

Ratio decidendi

In R v Blaue (1975), the court upheld the "thin skull rule," which dictates that a defendant must accept their victim as they are, including any pre-existing vulnerabilities or beliefs. This rule ensures that the defendant remains fully accountable for the harm inflicted, regardless of how the

victim's personal traits, such as religious beliefs, might intensify the injury. Consequently, Blaue

could not avoid liability merely because the victim's religious convictions made her more susceptible to the harm he caused.

Additionally, the court considered whether the victim's refusal of a life-saving blood transfusion interrupted the chain of causation between the stabbing and her death. It was determined that the refusal did not represent a significant intervening act sufficient to sever the causal link. Therefore, the stabbing was deemed the direct cause of her death. R v Blaue thus emphasizes that a victim's personal characteristics do not lessen the defendant's liability and illustrates that intervening factors do not break the chain of causation if the defendant’s actions remain a major and direct cause of the outcome.

4.R v Dalloway

Facts

The defendant was riding a cart with horses attached and wasn’t holding the reigns when a child (the victim) ran into the road, subsequently dying by one of the wheels. Initially, the defendant was charged with negligent driving and the death of the child.

Issue

Whether the result of Dalloway’s action had caused the death of the child

Law Applied

Justice Erle directed the jury that a negligent party, causing the death of another, would be found to be guilty of manslaughter.

Ratio decidendi

Expert evidence was produced which demonstrated that if Dalloway had been holding on to the reins tightly, he would not have been able to stop the cart before it collided with and killed the child.

On this basis, the act Dalloway was culpable for (not holding the reins), was not the cause of the death of the child. As a result of this, the jury decided to acquit Dalloway, as they were satisfied that the child’s death could not have been avoided. Thus, he wasn’t held guilty for the victim’s death.

Consequently, causation in this instance was not present due to the substantial evidence whereby; even if the appellant was holding tightly onto the reins and attempted to stop the cart, the victim would’ve died regardless of the fact. The problem lies with how he drove the cart and not at what speed. The jury focused on whether or not the appellant holding the reins tightly/properly caused the victim’s death. Hence, the ‘but for test’ was applied, as they safely came to the conclusion that but for D holding the reins carelessly, the victim would’ve died anyways. Which means there was no direct link between the manner in which D held the reins and the victim’s cause of death. Therefore, D’s act, or rather lack thereof, wasn’t the proximate cause of death.

R v Jordan versus R v Smith

Both of these cases are key in Criminal law especially when dealing with the principles of causation and Novus Actus Interveniens. If the chain of causation was broken, then the defendant would not be found liable and the new intervening act that broke the chain of causation removes or lessens the defendant's liability in the case.

In the case of R v Jordan,the medical treatment that the defendant received was so wrong that it constituted novus actus interveniens therefore, breaking the chain of causation and resulting in the defendant not being held liable for the death.

Contrarily, in the case of R v Smith, the original act committed by the defendant was considered the substantial and operating cause of the victim's death which means that the chain of causation was not broken and the defendant was still criminally liable .

In conclusion, the distinction between the two cases lies in the severity of the intervening act. IIn R v Jordan, the negligent medical treatment was enough of an intervening act to remove the, liability from the defendant whereas in R v Smith, the mistreatment of the victim was not severe enough to break the chain of causation, so the initial injury was still seen as the cause of death solidifying the claim that the defendant was criminally liable.

R v Dalloway versus R v Blaue

With both cogent cases, the difference lies in whether the chain of causation was broken or not. For, it was broken, the appellant wasn’t found guilty, but if it wasn’t broken, he would be charged for murder, as we will see by use of the but for test.

In R v D, since if it weren’t for D poorly holding the reins, the victim would have still died, D’s action wasn’t the cause of death. What D failed to do, his negligence, was not the proximate cause of death, thus, the chain of causation was broken and he wasn’t found guilty.

Contrastingly, in R v B, since if it weren’t for B stabbing the victim, the victim would have still been alive (as well as not in a position to refuse medical treatment due to her religion). B’s action was therefore the substantial cause of the victim’s death, thus her refusal for the treatment didn’t break the chain of causation, it still stood. Furthermore, this introduced the point that the appellants act need not be the only cause of the victim’s death, but the proximate one, as the victims refusal and reason behind it, was partially to blame for her not receiving the necessary treatment.

Conclusively, the actions of the appellants on their respective victims, determined whether or not the chain of causation was broken, thus differentiating the two cases, as in R v D, it was destroyed, though in R v B, it remained.